ExComm Deliberations

Ball joined the first senior discussions and examined diplomatic consequences of attacking Soviet missile installations in Cuba.

Bundy informed Kennedy at 8:45 a.m. that a major international crisis had developed.

Dillon joined the crisis deliberations and supported careful evaluation of the economic and political consequences of military action.

Kennedy convened his principal advisers at 11:45 a.m. to examine the missile evidence and possible responses.

Kennedy ordered continued secrecy while advisers studied the risks of surprise attack, quarantine, and invasion.

Kennedy ordered that the discovery of Soviet missiles remain secret while his advisers evaluated military and diplomatic options.

Robert Kennedy participated in the secret advisory meetings that later became known as ExComm.

Robert Kennedy joined the first crisis discussions and questioned the political and moral consequences of a surprise attack on Cuba.

Lundahl briefed Kennedy directly on the U-2 photographs and explained how analysts identified the Soviet missile equipment.

McNamara discussed military options including surveillance, quarantine, air strikes, and invasion.

Rusk joined discussions of diplomatic, political, and military responses to the Soviet deployment.

Taylor and the Joint Chiefs developed plans for attacks against missile sites and other military targets.

Bundy coordinated meetings and intelligence distribution as advisers compared military and political responses to the missile deployment.

Gilpatric helped assess air-strike and quarantine options while the Defense Department prepared forces for possible action.

Kennedy continued reviewing air-strike, invasion, quarantine, and diplomatic alternatives with his advisers.

McCone briefed officials on expanding intelligence evidence and the estimated readiness of the missile sites.

McNamara asked military planners to refine blockade, air-strike, and invasion options while the President considered how to respond.

Rusk examined diplomatic consequences of air strikes, invasion, and quarantine while the missile discovery remained secret.

Stevenson urged consideration of a diplomatic settlement alongside military pressure.

Gromyko told Kennedy that Soviet assistance to Cuba was defensive and denied an offensive deployment.

Gromyko assured Kennedy that Soviet assistance to Cuba was defensive while the President already possessed evidence of offensive missile sites.

Kennedy told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States would not tolerate offensive missiles in Cuba; Gromyko denied that offensive Soviet weapons were being deployed.

Kennedy restated his public warning to Gromyko without revealing that the missile sites had been photographed.

Kennedy met Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko while withholding knowledge of the photographed missile sites.

Lundahl's analysts continued comparing new imagery to Soviet missile systems and locating additional offensive installations.

McCone reported continuing intelligence analysis as reconnaissance identified additional missile and bomber-related installations.

McNamara worked on a quarantine plan designed to halt additional offensive weapons without immediately attacking existing missile sites.

Rusk participated in preparations for the Gromyko meeting and supported maintaining secrecy about the photographic evidence.

Stevenson proposed exploring a negotiated settlement that could remove the Soviet missiles while avoiding a direct military confrontation.

Taylor presented military assessments emphasizing that an air strike might have to be followed by a larger invasion of Cuba.

Thompson used his experience with Khrushchev to advise that Soviet intentions and domestic pressures should be interpreted cautiously.

Kennedy maintained scheduled campaign appearances while secret crisis deliberations continued in Washington.

Kennedy left Washington for campaign appearances while advisers continued secret deliberations about Cuba.

Robert Kennedy argued that an unannounced air strike could resemble the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Bundy helped organize the decision process that produced Kennedy's choice of a naval quarantine.

Kennedy returned to Washington and presided over a National Security Council meeting on the response.

The White House announced that Kennedy had a cold as he cancelled remaining campaign appearances.

Kennedy selected a naval quarantine as the initial response while retaining stronger military options.

Robert Kennedy supported the quarantine option as a measured response that preserved room for further diplomatic pressure.

McNamara organized the naval interception plan and continued preparations for air strikes and invasion.

McNamara briefed Kennedy on naval interception procedures and the military preparations supporting the proposed quarantine.

Rusk supported the quarantine decision while the State Department prepared allied consultations and diplomatic notifications.

Sorensen helped draft language explaining the quarantine and the administration's demand for removal of Soviet offensive weapons.

Taylor supervised continued planning for air strikes and invasion after Kennedy selected the quarantine as the first step.

Bundy coordinated White House preparations for the President's address and the formal establishment of ExComm.

Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.

Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.