Soviet Union and the Cuban Missile Crisis

Khrushchev discussed placing Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba as a means of strengthening the island's defense and Soviet strategic leverage.

Biryuzov joined a Soviet delegation that discussed the proposed missile deployment with Cuban leaders.

Malinovsky supported the secret military deployment later conducted under the codename Operation Anadyr.

Biryuzov surveyed Cuban terrain and concluded that Soviet missile units could be deployed secretly enough to support the proposed operation.

Biryuzov reported favorably on the feasibility of deploying strategic missiles in Cuba after returning from the Soviet mission.

Malinovsky supervised military planning for Operation Anadyr as Soviet forces prepared for the concealed deployment to Cuba.

The Soviet military began Operation Anadyr to transport troops, missiles, aircraft, and supporting equipment to Cuba.

Pliyev commanded the Soviet Group of Forces in Cuba as missile, air-defense, armored, and support units arrived under Operation Anadyr.

Gromyko told Kennedy that Soviet assistance to Cuba was defensive and denied an offensive deployment.

Gromyko assured Kennedy that Soviet assistance to Cuba was defensive while the President already possessed evidence of offensive missile sites.

Dobrynin received formal American communications after Kennedy publicly announced the missile evidence and naval quarantine.

Gromyko helped manage the Soviet diplomatic response after Kennedy revealed the missiles and announced the naval quarantine.

Malinovsky placed Soviet military commands on heightened alert after Kennedy announced the quarantine and demanded missile removal.

Pliyev placed Soviet forces in Cuba on increased readiness after Kennedy announced the quarantine and demanded missile withdrawal.

Zorin challenged the American quarantine at the Security Council and rejected United States accusations about offensive Soviet weapons.

Khrushchev rejected the legality of the American quarantine but ordered Soviet shipping movements handled cautiously as the confrontation intensified.

Khrushchev exchanged messages with Kennedy as both governments searched for a way to prevent the naval confrontation from escalating.

Zorin refused to answer Stevenson's demand for an immediate admission that Soviet missiles were present in Cuba.

Zorin faced Stevenson's presentation of aerial photographs after declining to confirm that Soviet missiles had been installed in Cuba.

Dobrynin maintained urgent contact with Moscow while unofficial channels explored possible terms for ending the confrontation.

Feklisov, using the name Aleksandr Fomin, discussed a possible settlement with journalist John Scali.

Feklisov relayed John Scali's interest in a possible settlement through Soviet channels while official negotiations remained uncertain.

Khruschev sends a letter to Kennedy suggesting that the sites would be dismantled if the United States gave its reassurance that it would not invade Cuba.

Khrushchev sent Kennedy a lengthy private message proposing missile withdrawal in return for a pledge that Cuba would not be invaded.

Arkhipov opposed launching B-59's nuclear torpedo and helped persuade the submarine commander to surface.

Dobrynin received an urgent warning that the United States would soon act if the Cuban missiles remained.

Dobrynin heard Robert Kennedy privately indicate that the obsolete Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed after the Cuban crisis.

Feklisov continued informal contact with Scali as Washington and Moscow searched for a formula that could end the crisis.

Khrushchev publicly added removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey to the terms he sought for resolving the crisis.

Pliyev's command faced intense pressure as American reconnaissance continued and a Soviet surface-to-air unit shot down Anderson's U-2.

Savitsky considered using a nuclear torpedo after United States forces used signalling depth charges near submarine B-59.

Biryuzov's missile forces received orders to dismantle the Cuban launch sites and prepare the strategic missiles for return shipment.

Dobrynin reported American reactions to Moscow as the Soviet government announced acceptance of the missile-withdrawal settlement.

Gromyko participated in implementing the diplomatic settlement after Khrushchev agreed to withdraw the offensive missiles.

Khrushchev agrees to remove the Soviet missiles from Cuba. Khruschev removes the missiles but on the understanding the USA does not invade Cuba.

Khrushchev ordered the offensive missiles dismantled and returned to the Soviet Union under the emerging settlement.

Malinovsky transmitted orders connected with dismantling and returning the offensive missile systems after the political settlement.

Khrushchev defended the settlement to Soviet leaders while implementation shifted toward dismantling, shipment, and verification.

Khrushchev continued correspondence with Kennedy about verification and the remaining questions surrounding Soviet military equipment in Cuba.

Mikoyan arrived in Cuba to explain the Soviet-American settlement and negotiate its implementation with Fidel Castro.

Mikoyan defended Moscow's decision to remove the strategic missiles despite Castro's anger over being excluded from the final agreement.

Mikoyan continued difficult negotiations with Cuban leaders over inspections, tactical weapons, and Soviet military equipment remaining on the island.

Khrushchev resisted American demands over Soviet IL-28 bombers while negotiations continued after the ballistic missiles were dismantled.

Mikoyan pressed for acceptance of Soviet decisions concerning withdrawal of weapons while seeking to preserve the alliance with Cuba.

Khrushchev accepted removal of the IL-28 bombers, clearing the principal remaining obstacle to ending the American quarantine.

Mikoyan's negotiations helped manage the final stages of Soviet withdrawal as the United States prepared to end the quarantine.