John Fitzgerald Kennedy30 November 1961
President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, a covert programme directed against Fidel Castro's government.
United States of America · Government / Democratic Party Government. Chronological records rendered directly from the World History Database.
President Kennedy authorized Operation Mongoose, a covert programme directed against Fidel Castro's government.
Kennedy publicly warned that offensive weapons introduced into Cuba would create the gravest consequences.
From France, McCone warned that extensive Soviet defensive preparations in Cuba could be intended to conceal the later installation of medium-range ballistic missiles.
Kennedy repeated that the United States would act if Cuba became a significant offensive military base.
Kennedy signed legislation authorizing measures to prevent Cuban aggression and Soviet military expansion in the hemisphere.
Bundy learned that photographic evidence confirmed Soviet offensive missile installations in Cuba.
Ball joined the first senior discussions and examined diplomatic consequences of attacking Soviet missile installations in Cuba.
Bundy informed Kennedy at 8:45 a.m. that a major international crisis had developed.
Dillon joined the crisis deliberations and supported careful evaluation of the economic and political consequences of military action.
Kennedy convened his principal advisers at 11:45 a.m. to examine the missile evidence and possible responses.
Kennedy ordered continued secrecy while advisers studied the risks of surprise attack, quarantine, and invasion.
Kennedy ordered that the discovery of Soviet missiles remain secret while his advisers evaluated military and diplomatic options.
Robert Kennedy participated in the secret advisory meetings that later became known as ExComm.
Robert Kennedy joined the first crisis discussions and questioned the political and moral consequences of a surprise attack on Cuba.
McNamara discussed military options including surveillance, quarantine, air strikes, and invasion.
Rusk joined discussions of diplomatic, political, and military responses to the Soviet deployment.
Bundy coordinated meetings and intelligence distribution as advisers compared military and political responses to the missile deployment.
Gilpatric helped assess air-strike and quarantine options while the Defense Department prepared forces for possible action.
Kennedy continued reviewing air-strike, invasion, quarantine, and diplomatic alternatives with his advisers.
McCone briefed senior officials on expanding photographic evidence and the estimated readiness of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba.
McNamara asked military planners to refine blockade, air-strike, and invasion options while the President considered how to respond.
Rusk examined diplomatic consequences of air strikes, invasion, and quarantine while the missile discovery remained secret.
Stevenson urged consideration of a diplomatic settlement alongside military pressure.
Kennedy told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States would not tolerate offensive missiles in Cuba; Gromyko denied that offensive Soviet weapons were being deployed.
Kennedy restated his public warning to Gromyko without revealing that the missile sites had been photographed.
Kennedy met Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko while withholding knowledge of the photographed missile sites.
McCone reviewed new intelligence as reconnaissance identified additional missile activity and bomber-related installations in Cuba.
McNamara worked on a quarantine plan designed to halt additional offensive weapons without immediately attacking existing missile sites.
Rusk participated in preparations for the Gromyko meeting and supported maintaining secrecy about the photographic evidence.
Stevenson proposed exploring a negotiated settlement that could remove the Soviet missiles while avoiding a direct military confrontation.
Thompson used his experience with Khrushchev to advise that Soviet intentions and domestic pressures should be interpreted cautiously.
Kennedy maintained scheduled campaign appearances while secret crisis deliberations continued in Washington.
Kennedy left Washington for campaign appearances while advisers continued secret deliberations about Cuba.
Robert Kennedy argued that an unannounced air strike could resemble the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Bundy helped organize the decision process that produced Kennedy's choice of a naval quarantine.
Kennedy returned to Washington and presided over a National Security Council meeting on the response.
The White House announced that Kennedy had a cold as he cancelled remaining campaign appearances.
Kennedy selected a naval quarantine as the initial response while retaining stronger military options.
Robert Kennedy supported the quarantine option as a measured response that preserved room for further diplomatic pressure.
McNamara organized the naval interception plan and continued preparations for air strikes and invasion.
McNamara briefed Kennedy on naval interception procedures and the military preparations supporting the proposed quarantine.
Rusk supported the quarantine decision while the State Department prepared allied consultations and diplomatic notifications.
Sorensen helped draft language explaining the quarantine and the administration's demand for removal of Soviet offensive weapons.
Kennedy reviewed the quarantine proclamation, military rules, and the planned address to the nation.
McCone assessed the growing operational capability of the Soviet missile deployment while the administration refined its response.
Sorensen refined Kennedy's television address so that the missile evidence, quarantine, and warning to Moscow were presented clearly.
Ball helped coordinate diplomatic communications with allies and international organizations as the quarantine was announced.
Bundy coordinated White House preparations for the President's address and the formal establishment of ExComm.
Kennedy informs the world that the Soviet Union was building secret missile bases in Cuba, a mere 90 miles off the shores of Florida.
Kennedy orders Khrushchev to remove all the missile bases and their deadly contents. Kennedy orders a naval quarantine of Cuba in order to prevent Russian ships from bringing additional missiles and construction materials.
Kennedy addressed the nation and revealed the Soviet offensive missile deployment in Cuba.
Kennedy announced a naval quarantine intended to prevent further deliveries of offensive military equipment.
Kennedy briefed congressional leaders before publicly announcing the crisis.
Kennedy demanded dismantlement of the missile sites and removal of the offensive weapons from Cuba.
Kennedy warned that a nuclear missile launched from Cuba would require retaliation against the Soviet Union.
Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.
Sorensen assisted with final revisions to the President's address before Kennedy disclosed the crisis to the public.
Stevenson prepared the United States diplomatic case for presentation before the United Nations Security Council.
The Organisation of American States unanimously supports the US decision to quarantine Cuba and , by the end of the day, all naval vessels are in place. Reconnaissance photos reveal that Soviet missiles are poised for launch.
Kennedy signed the proclamation establishing interdiction of offensive weapons shipments to Cuba.
Kennedy approved continued invasion preparations while excluding food and medicine from the initial quarantine.
Kennedy approved instructions for naval forces enforcing the quarantine while seeking to avoid an unnecessary clash with Soviet ships.
McCone reported intelligence indicating that Soviet personnel controlled the offensive missile installations in Cuba.
McNamara reviewed rules governing interception, inspection, and possible seizure of vessels carrying prohibited military equipment.
Stevenson defended the quarantine before the Security Council and challenged Soviet claims about the nature of the Cuban deployment.
Gilpatric assisted in coordinating military readiness and civilian control as naval quarantine operations began.
Kennedy reported that several Soviet ships had altered course as the quarantine took effect. Strategic Air Command was ordered to DEFCON 2, the highest readiness level it had yet reached.
Kennedy monitored the first day of quarantine operations as several Soviet vessels slowed, stopped, or changed course.
Robert Kennedy followed quarantine developments while officials debated how much force naval commanders should use against Soviet vessels.
McCone reviewed intelligence on Soviet shipping movements and continuing activity at Cuban missile sites as the quarantine took effect.
McNamara closely supervised naval operations as the quarantine line became active in the Atlantic approaches to Cuba.
Rusk assessed Soviet responses to the quarantine and encouraged continued diplomatic contact while military forces remained ready.
Thompson argued that Khrushchev should be given a path to retreat without appearing to accept an American ultimatum.
Kennedy replied to U Thant and affirmed his desire for a peaceful and verifiable settlement.
Kennedy wrote Khrushchev that Soviet assurances had been contradicted by clear evidence of offensive missile bases in Cuba.
Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin at the Security Council and presented reconnaissance photographs demonstrating Soviet missile installations.
Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy suggesting that the sites would be dismantled if the United States gave its reassurance that it would not invade Cuba.
Kennedy delayed military action to allow additional time for diplomacy after receiving Khrushchev's proposal.
Robert Kennedy supported giving diplomacy more time after Khrushchev sent a message offering missile removal for a non-invasion pledge.
McCone reviewed estimates showing that work continued at several missile installations while diplomatic exchanges intensified.
Rusk reviewed Khrushchev's first settlement proposal and supported exploring the possibility of a non-invasion assurance.
Scali reported a Soviet back-channel proposal linking missile removal to a United States pledge not to invade Cuba.
Stevenson worked with U Thant on proposals intended to reduce the risk of a naval or military clash.
Thompson interpreted Khrushchev's first letter as a serious opening for a negotiated settlement.
Ball took part in discussions over the competing Soviet proposals and the risks of linking Cuba publicly to Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.
Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.
Kennedy answered Khrushchev's first proposal and offered a non-invasion assurance after verified missile removal.
Kennedy postponed retaliation for the U-2 loss while advisers pursued a diplomatic solution.
Kennedy chose to answer Khrushchev's earlier, more conciliatory proposal while leaving the public demand concerning Turkey unanswered.
Kennedy authorized Robert Kennedy to tell Dobrynin privately that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would later be removed.
Robert Kennedy met secretly with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Justice Department.
Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President could not publicly trade the Turkish Jupiter missiles for Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Robert Kennedy warned Dobrynin that events could soon escape political control if the Soviet missiles were not withdrawn.
McNamara argued against automatic retaliation after the loss of Rudolf Anderson's U-2, helping preserve time for negotiation.
Rusk participated in the decision to respond to Khrushchev's earlier letter rather than accept the public Turkey-for-Cuba trade.
Sorensen helped draft the response accepting the essential terms of Khrushchev's first proposal while avoiding a public missile trade.
Thompson urged Kennedy to answer Khrushchev's first message and avoid becoming trapped by the later public demand concerning Turkey.
Bundy helped coordinate immediate follow-up after the Soviet decision to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
Kennedy welcomed Khrushchev's decision as an important contribution to peace.
Kennedy directed officials to continue verification and quarantine measures until Soviet offensive weapons were actually removed.
Robert Kennedy participated in discussions on implementing the agreement while maintaining secrecy around the private Turkish missile understanding.
McCone emphasized continued reconnaissance and verification after Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
McNamara directed the military to maintain pressure and surveillance while Soviet forces began preparing the missiles for removal.
Rusk directed diplomatic work on verification and implementation after Moscow announced that the missiles would be removed.
Sorensen assisted with Kennedy's public response welcoming the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba.
Thompson helped assess Khrushchev's acceptance message and advised continued attention to Soviet implementation.
Kennedy instructed his advisers to handle the settlement cautiously while reconnaissance monitored dismantling at Cuban missile sites.
Robert Kennedy urged continued caution as the administration moved from immediate confrontation toward verification and settlement.
Stevenson continued United Nations negotiations concerning verification, withdrawal, and arrangements for ending the quarantine.
McCone reviewed reconnaissance showing dismantled missile equipment moving toward Cuban ports for shipment back to the Soviet Union.
Kennedy ordered the naval quarantine lifted after agreement on removal of the Soviet IL-28 bombers.
McNamara oversaw the military transition from quarantine operations after the remaining Soviet IL-28 bombers were scheduled for withdrawal.
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