White House in History

Chief Justice Earl Warren administered McCone's oath as Director of Central Intelligence in the White House Cabinet Room.

Lundahl briefed Kennedy directly on the U-2 photographs and explained how analysts identified the Soviet missile equipment.

Dillon joined the crisis deliberations and supported careful evaluation of the economic and political consequences of military action.

Kennedy convened his principal advisers at 11:45 a.m. to examine the missile evidence and possible responses.

Kennedy ordered continued secrecy while advisers studied the risks of surprise attack, quarantine, and invasion.

Kennedy ordered that the discovery of Soviet missiles remain secret while his advisers evaluated military and diplomatic options.

Bundy informed Kennedy at 8:45 a.m. that a major international crisis had developed.

Robert Kennedy participated in the secret advisory meetings that later became known as ExComm.

Robert Kennedy joined the first crisis discussions and questioned the political and moral consequences of a surprise attack on Cuba.

McNamara discussed military options including surveillance, quarantine, air strikes, and invasion.

Kennedy continued reviewing air-strike, invasion, quarantine, and diplomatic alternatives with his advisers.

Bundy coordinated meetings and intelligence distribution as advisers compared military and political responses to the missile deployment.

Kennedy restated his public warning to Gromyko without revealing that the missile sites had been photographed.

Kennedy met Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko while withholding knowledge of the photographed missile sites.

Thompson used his experience with Khrushchev to advise that Soviet intentions and domestic pressures should be interpreted cautiously.

McCone joined Kennedy and senior advisers in reviewing blockade, air-strike, invasion, diplomatic, and warning options during the first days of the missile crisis.

Kennedy selected a naval quarantine as the initial response while retaining stronger military options.

Bundy helped organize the decision process that produced Kennedy's choice of a naval quarantine.

McNamara briefed Kennedy on naval interception procedures and the military preparations supporting the proposed quarantine.

Sorensen helped draft language explaining the quarantine and the administration's demand for removal of Soviet offensive weapons.

Kennedy reviewed the quarantine proclamation, military rules, and the planned address to the nation.

Sorensen refined Kennedy's television address so that the missile evidence, quarantine, and warning to Moscow were presented clearly.

Sweeney advised Kennedy that air strikes could not guarantee destruction of every operational missile.

Kennedy formally established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council.

Bundy coordinated White House preparations for the President's address and the formal establishment of ExComm.

Sorensen assisted with final revisions to the President's address before Kennedy disclosed the crisis to the public.

Kennedy approved continued invasion preparations while excluding food and medicine from the initial quarantine.

Kennedy monitored the first day of quarantine operations as several Soviet vessels slowed, stopped, or changed course.

Thompson argued that Khrushchev should be given a path to retreat without appearing to accept an American ultimatum.

Kennedy delayed military action to allow additional time for diplomacy after receiving Khrushchev's proposal.

Thompson interpreted Khrushchev's first letter as a serious opening for a negotiated settlement.

Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.

Kennedy postponed retaliation for the U-2 loss while advisers pursued a diplomatic solution.

Kennedy chose to answer Khrushchev's earlier, more conciliatory proposal while leaving the public demand concerning Turkey unanswered.

Kennedy authorized Robert Kennedy to tell Dobrynin privately that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would later be removed.

Thompson urged Kennedy to answer Khrushchev's first message and avoid becoming trapped by the later public demand concerning Turkey.

Taylor advised on military responses after Anderson's U-2 was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile over Cuba.

Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.

Sorensen helped draft the response accepting the essential terms of Khrushchev's first proposal while avoiding a public missile trade.

Thompson helped assess Khrushchev's acceptance message and advised continued attention to Soviet implementation.

Bundy helped coordinate immediate follow-up after the Soviet decision to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.

Sorensen assisted with Kennedy's public response welcoming the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba.

McCone briefed the Executive Committee on Soviet deployment, missile withdrawal, and intelligence concerning the continuing military situation in Cuba.

McCone warned Kennedy that Soviet communications, Cuban support for regional subversion, and Moscow's public claims required caution in any final settlement with Castro.

McCone recommended that the United States disassociate itself from unauthorized Cuban exile raids and take steps to prevent their continuation.

McCone joined Kennedy, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Bundy in reviewing the rapidly developing coup situation and American responsibilities in South Vietnam.

Warren presented the completed assassination report to President Johnson at the White House on September 24, 1964.

McCone met President Johnson for the final time as DCI, urged stronger personal intelligence briefings for his successor, and retired as William Raborn took office.

Meets with Nixon three days after the break-in in a conversation whose recording later becomes notorious for an eighteen-and-a-half-minute gap.

Discusses with Nixon a plan for CIA officials to ask the FBI to limit inquiries into funding connected with the Watergate burglars.

Agrees with Haldeman on using the CIA to tell the FBI that aspects of the Watergate money investigation involve national security concerns.

Warns Nixon that the Watergate cover-up has become a cancer on the presidency and describes growing demands for money and possible clemency.

Discusses with John Dean the cost of meeting Watergate defendants' financial demands and the legal and political dangers surrounding continued payments.

Discusses with Nixon the possible use of campaign contributions for Watergate defendants and the risk that such payments could appear to obstruct justice.

Discusses limiting White House testimony and using executive privilege as investigators press for evidence about Watergate and political intelligence operations.