27 October 1962: Black Saturday

Castro urges Khrushchev to launch a nuclear first strike against the United States if Cuba is invaded, but Khrushchev rejected any first strike response.

Arkhipov opposed launching B-59's nuclear torpedo and helped persuade the submarine commander to surface.

Dobrynin received an urgent warning that the United States would soon act if the Cuban missiles remained.

Dobrynin heard Robert Kennedy privately indicate that the obsolete Jupiter missiles in Turkey would be removed after the Cuban crisis.

Feklisov continued informal contact with Scali as Washington and Moscow searched for a formula that could end the crisis.

Khrushchev publicly added removal of American Jupiter missiles from Turkey to the terms he sought for resolving the crisis.

Pliyev's command faced intense pressure as American reconnaissance continued and a Soviet surface-to-air unit shot down Anderson's U-2.

Savitsky considered using a nuclear torpedo after United States forces used signalling depth charges near submarine B-59.

A Soviet surface-to-air missile shot down Anderson's unarmed U-2 over Cuba, killing him.

Ball took part in discussions over the competing Soviet proposals and the risks of linking Cuba publicly to Jupiter missiles in Turkey.

Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.

Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.

Kennedy answered Khrushchev's first proposal and offered a non-invasion assurance after verified missile removal.

Kennedy postponed retaliation for the U-2 loss while advisers pursued a diplomatic solution.

Kennedy chose to answer Khrushchev's earlier, more conciliatory proposal while leaving the public demand concerning Turkey unanswered.

Kennedy authorized Robert Kennedy to tell Dobrynin privately that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would later be removed.

Robert Kennedy met secretly with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Justice Department.

Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President could not publicly trade the Turkish Jupiter missiles for Soviet missiles in Cuba.

Robert Kennedy warned Dobrynin that events could soon escape political control if the Soviet missiles were not withdrawn.

Maultsby's U-2 accidentally entered Soviet airspace during a mission over the Arctic and escaped interception.

McNamara argued against automatic retaliation after the loss of Rudolf Anderson's U-2, helping preserve time for negotiation.

Rusk participated in the decision to respond to Khrushchev's earlier letter rather than accept the public Turkey-for-Cuba trade.

Sorensen helped draft the response accepting the essential terms of Khrushchev's first proposal while avoiding a public missile trade.

Taylor advised on military responses after Anderson's U-2 was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile over Cuba.

Thompson urged Kennedy to answer Khrushchev's first message and avoid becoming trapped by the later public demand concerning Turkey.