Cuban Missile Crisis
Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin at the Security Council and presented reconnaissance photographs demonstrating Soviet missile installations.
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Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin at the Security Council and presented reconnaissance photographs demonstrating Soviet missile installations.
Scali reported a Soviet back-channel proposal linking missile removal to a United States pledge not to invade Cuba.
Thompson interpreted Khrushchev's first letter as a serious opening for a negotiated settlement.
Robert Kennedy supported giving diplomacy more time after Khrushchev sent a message offering missile removal for a non-invasion pledge.
McCone reviewed estimates showing that work continued at several missile installations while diplomatic exchanges intensified.
Kennedy delayed military action to allow additional time for diplomacy after receiving Khrushchev's proposal.
Stevenson worked with U Thant on proposals intended to reduce the risk of a naval or military clash.
Rusk reviewed Khrushchev's first settlement proposal and supported exploring the possibility of a non-invasion assurance.
Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy suggesting that the sites would be dismantled if the United States gave its reassurance that it would not invade Cuba.
Thompson urged Kennedy to answer Khrushchev's first message and avoid becoming trapped by the later public demand concerning Turkey.
Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President could not publicly trade the Turkish Jupiter missiles for Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Robert Kennedy warned Dobrynin that events could soon escape political control if the Soviet missiles were not withdrawn.
Robert Kennedy met secretly with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Justice Department.
Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.
Kennedy answered Khrushchev's first proposal and offered a non-invasion assurance after verified missile removal.
Kennedy authorized Robert Kennedy to tell Dobrynin privately that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would later be removed.
Kennedy chose to answer Khrushchev's earlier, more conciliatory proposal while leaving the public demand concerning Turkey unanswered.
Kennedy postponed retaliation for the U-2 loss while advisers pursued a diplomatic solution.
McNamara argued against automatic retaliation after the loss of Rudolf Anderson's U-2, helping preserve time for negotiation.
Rusk participated in the decision to respond to Khrushchev's earlier letter rather than accept the public Turkey-for-Cuba trade.
Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.
Sorensen helped draft the response accepting the essential terms of Khrushchev's first proposal while avoiding a public missile trade.
Ball took part in discussions over the competing Soviet proposals and the risks of linking Cuba publicly to Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
Thompson helped assess Khrushchev's acceptance message and advised continued attention to Soviet implementation.
Robert Kennedy participated in discussions on implementing the agreement while maintaining secrecy around the private Turkish missile understanding.
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