DESOTO Patrol Resumed
Barnhart took USS Turner Joy back into the Gulf alongside USS Maddox as the two ships resumed the DESOTO patrol under newly issued operating restrictions.
Permanent historical records · Updated 2026-11-03
1964 in United States of America — Page 4
Explore 528 historical events and records for United States of America in 1964.
Historical records for United States of America in 1964
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August
Night Attack Readiness
Barnhart prepared Turner Joy for another possible surface attack by maintaining close coordination with Maddox and readiness to maneuver independently against torpedo craft.
Two-Destroyer Formation Orders
Herrick directed Turner Joy to follow Maddox while retaining freedom to maneuver for gunfire and torpedo evasion if the patrol was attacked again.
Allied Governments Notified
Rusk directed urgent diplomatic messages explaining the reported attacks and the limited American response to allied governments, NATO, SEATO, and other foreign partners.
Attack Report to President
McNamara informed Johnson that reports indicated the destroyers were under torpedo attack and advised him that the Defense Department was preparing possible retaliatory measures.
Briefing of Nguyen Khanh
Taylor was instructed to give Nguyen Khanh an accurate account of the Tonkin events, explain the planned American response, and urge South Vietnam not to undertake independent external action.
Congressional Leadership Consultation
Johnson summoned congressional leaders to the White House and briefed them on the reported Tonkin attack and the military response he had authorized.
Demand for Attack Confirmation
Sharp pressed the destroyer group for direct supporting evidence that an attack had occurred before Washington completed its decision on military retaliation.
Doubt over Second Attack
After reviewing the reports from his ships, Herrick warned Pacific Command that many supposed contacts and torpedoes were doubtful and might have resulted from weather and sonar errors.
Fire on Suspected Contacts
Ogier's crew fired illumination and gunfire toward suspected surface contacts during the confused night action that was initially interpreted as a renewed torpedo-boat attack.
Gulf of Tonkin Address
Addresses the nation after reported attacks in the Gulf of Tonkin
Immediate Response Recommended
Rusk argued during crisis discussions that the reported attack required an immediate direct response while diplomatic notifications were prepared for allied governments and international organizations.
Message to Nguyen Khanh
Johnson sent Prime Minister Nguyen Khanh a message explaining that the American strikes were intended to defend United States rights while avoiding an uncontrolled expansion of the conflict.
Night Contact Alert
Herrick's task group reacted to high-speed radar and sonar contacts during the stormy night patrol and initially reported that hostile craft were closing on the destroyers.
Night Reconnaissance Over Destroyers
Stockdale flew low over Maddox and Turner Joy for more than an hour while the ships were firing, searching the dark Gulf for North Vietnamese boats.
No Visual Contact Report
Stockdale reported that he could see the American destroyers and their gunfire but did not observe enemy boats, wakes, gunfire, or torpedo tracks during the alleged second attack.
North Vietnamese Motive Assessment
McCone advised the National Security Council that North Vietnam appeared to be reacting defensively to attacks on its offshore islands rather than deliberately seeking a wider war.
Pierce Arrow Authorization
Johnson approved a limited retaliatory operation against North Vietnamese patrol-boat bases and petroleum facilities after receiving reports of a second attack in the Gulf.
Retaliation Options Prepared
McNamara developed several limited strike options against patrol boats, naval bases, petroleum facilities, bridges, and other targets as the administration considered its response.
Revised Ambush Assessment
Herrick later reported that the opening phase still appeared to him to be a genuine ambush, while acknowledging that the subsequent action remained confused and the number of attackers could not be determined.
Seventh Fleet Readiness Coordination
Wheeler coordinated with Pacific commanders as Washington prepared to reinforce naval readiness and protect the destroyer patrol after the reported second attack.
Turner Joy Battle Stations
Barnhart placed Turner Joy at battle readiness as radar contacts appeared to approach the formation and the destroyers increased speed and maneuvered defensively.
Capture during Pierce Arrow
Alvarez was shot down while flying an A-4 Skyhawk during Operation Pierce Arrow and became the first United States naval aviator captured by North Vietnam.
Death during Pierce Arrow
Sather was killed when his A-1 Skyraider was shot down by North Vietnamese antiaircraft fire during the retaliatory carrier strikes of Operation Pierce Arrow.
Pierce Arrow Press Briefing
McNamara announced that carrier aircraft had flown dozens of strike sorties against North Vietnamese naval bases and petroleum storage facilities in retaliation for the reported Tonkin attacks.
Request for Southeast Asia Resolution
Johnson sent Congress a special message asking for a formal resolution demonstrating national unity and authorizing measures to protect United States forces and Southeast Asian allies.
Retaliatory Air Strikes
Orders retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese targets after reports of attacks on U.S. destroyers in the Gulf of Tonkin.
Syracuse Tonkin Speech
Johnson used a speech at Syracuse University to review the Tonkin incidents, explain the retaliatory strikes, and state that the United States did not seek a wider war.
UN Security Council Presentation
Stevenson presented the American account of the Gulf of Tonkin incidents and the resulting military response during a United Nations Security Council session.
Joint Senate Committee Testimony
Rusk appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees to describe the Tonkin events and argue for congressional approval of the Southeast Asia resolution.
Military Testimony on Tonkin
Wheeler joined Rusk and McNamara before Senate committees and provided the military leadership's account of the Gulf incidents and the need to protect American forces.
Tonkin Evidence Testimony
McNamara testified before a joint Senate hearing about the naval reports from 2 and 4 August and supported the administration's request for broad authority in Southeast Asia.
Constitutional Warning on Tonkin
Morse argued during the Senate debate that the proposed resolution amounted to advance authorization for war and gave the executive branch dangerously broad military discretion.
Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Receives congressional authorization to use military force in Vietnam
Letter to Khrushchev on Tonkin
Johnson wrote Nikita Khrushchev that the American response had been deliberately limited and asserted that the United States did not want the Tonkin crisis to expand further.
Senate Dissent Speech
Gruening opposed the resolution during the Senate debate because he believed it could deepen American military involvement in Vietnam without adequate congressional control.
Senate Management of Resolution
Fulbright guided the Southeast Asia resolution through the Senate and reassured colleagues that the administration said it did not intend to expand the war.
Tonkin Gulf Resolution
Enables Johnson to use armed force to help SEATO members to "defend their freedom". Congress authorizes "measures to repel any armed attack against forces of the US"
Tonkin Resolution
Defends administration policy during passage of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
Tonkin Resolution Opposition
Votes against the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution
How these records were prepared
Generated from the World History Database historical_events table. Identical display records are collapsed; descriptions otherwise retain the stored text. Coverage and source quality vary. Check primary and specialist sources before citing individual historical claims.