Cuban Missile Crisis
McCone emphasized continued reconnaissance and verification after Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
Role range: 1961-1965
Follow John A. McCone through 88 dated historical records for United States of America.
A chronological timeline drawn from matching World History Database records.
McCone emphasized continued reconnaissance and verification after Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone reviewed reconnaissance showing dismantled missile equipment moving toward Cuban ports for shipment back to the Soviet Union.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone sent McGeorge Bundy a memorandum outlining courses of action to follow as the administration moved from immediate crisis management toward verification and settlement.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone reviewed an Inspector General examination of how raw intelligence on the Soviet buildup had been handled before the missiles were photographed.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone received a CIA review describing the reconnaissance gap over central Cuba and the caution that had limited U-2 coverage before 14 October.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone urged McGeorge Bundy not to give Cuba an unconditional non-invasion pledge without satisfactory arrangements for inspection, verification, and protection against subversion.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone briefed the Executive Committee on Soviet deployment, missile withdrawal, and intelligence concerning the continuing military situation in Cuba.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone warned Kennedy that Soviet communications, Cuban support for regional subversion, and Moscow's public claims required caution in any final settlement with Castro.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone treated the coordinated post-crisis review of intelligence performance and Cuban reconnaissance as the final Intelligence Community report for presidential advisers.
Role range: 1961-1965
President Kennedy sent McCone a letter commending the Intelligence Community for its contribution during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone warned that a proposed test ban could constrain American weapons development without adequate assurance that prohibited Soviet activity would be detected.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone rejected a pessimistic draft national estimate on South Vietnam and directed further consultation, producing a final estimate with a more optimistic assessment.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone recommended that the United States disassociate itself from unauthorized Cuban exile raids and take steps to prevent their continuation.
Role range: 1961-1965
CIA initiated the Purcell Panel to advise McCone on the future course of the National Reconnaissance Program and advanced technical collection.
Role range: 1961-1965
CIA established a Research and Development Review Board to coordinate scientific and technical programs across Agency components during McCone's reorganization.
Role range: 1961-1965
Herbert Scoville left the research directorate, prompting McCone to reorganize CIA's science and technology structure and seek new leadership.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone created the Directorate of Science and Technology and selected Albert Wheelon to lead the expanded organization for technical intelligence and research.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone resisted proposals that would weaken CIA control of its Saigon station while officials debated Ambassador Lodge's authority and possible leadership changes.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, opposing Edward Lansdale as Saigon station chief while agreeing to find a replacement for John Richardson if required.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone directed creation of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center to strengthen independent CIA assessment of foreign missile and space capabilities.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone joined Kennedy, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Bundy in reviewing the rapidly developing coup situation and American responsibilities in South Vietnam.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone told Averell Harriman that CIA had not coordinated or endorsed the August policy cable on South Vietnam as Harriman had been led to believe.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone participated in administration discussions about exploratory contacts with Fidel Castro but regarded the diplomatic initiative skeptically while covert pressure continued.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone returned from Vietnam more discouraged about the war and increasingly doubtful that South Vietnamese leadership could carry its share of the burden.
Role range: 1961-1965
At President Johnson's early Vietnam policy conference, McCone gave a less optimistic assessment than other officials and questioned favorable forecasts from Saigon.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone discussed Cuba with President Johnson, who requested firm recommendations and more aggressive options while rejecting any repetition of the Bay of Pigs failure.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone told Johnson that portraying the DCI chiefly as a covert operator impaired his broader intelligence role; Johnson agreed that the public image should change.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone completed discussions in Saigon and found weak governmental leadership, uncertain military progress, and serious shortcomings in reporting on the counterinsurgency.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone told President Johnson that there were more reasons for pessimism than optimism in South Vietnam and that the new military government had not demonstrated effective leadership.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone ordered experienced CIA officers to Saigon temporarily to develop additional covert reporting on the new government's effectiveness and public acceptance.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone proposed a covert method for independently checking reports on the progress of the South Vietnamese war and counterinsurgency effort.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone discussed Vietnam with the Joint Chiefs while questioning whether existing intelligence reporting gave policymakers a reliable picture of conditions in the field.
Role range: 1961-1965
Following McCone's order, Soviet KGB defector Yuri Nosenko was brought to the United States for intensive questioning about his intelligence claims and Lee Harvey Oswald.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone joined a Special Group meeting reviewing clandestine and covert activities against Cuba while the Johnson administration reconsidered its pressure campaign.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone concluded that intelligence agencies had failed to anticipate the January coup by Nguyen Khanh and questioned whether warning indicators had been properly analyzed.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone was persuaded that Nosenko should not appear before the Warren Commission while CIA counterintelligence officers continued challenging the defector's credibility.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone testified before the Warren Commission about CIA information relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and possible foreign involvement in President Kennedy's assassination.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone challenged publication of The Invisible Government after CIA concluded that the book contained numerous security disclosures as well as many significant inaccuracies.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone told the National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee that he wanted CIA to retain its existing contracting responsibility for the CORONA satellite program.
Role range: 1961-1965
McCone briefed reconnaissance officials on plans to strengthen CIA's West Coast component and consolidate Agency contracting and support functions for CORONA.
Role range: 1961-1965
These dates and descriptions come from the historical_events database. Exact duplicate records have been collapsed. Names are grouped by the country, Name 2 and Name 1 fields; records with missing Name 2 cannot be reliably assigned to an individual biography. Check the underlying sources before formal citation.