John A. McCone Biography

McCone became the fourth Chairman of the United States Atomic Energy Commission, succeeding Lewis Strauss and beginning a term that lasted until January 1961.

McCone discussed a proposal with Secretary John Foster Dulles for limiting nuclear tests while preserving carefully controlled underground development work.

As AEC chairman, McCone oversaw Commission responsibilities when the United States suspended nuclear weapons testing as Geneva negotiations opened.

McCone argued that any nuclear test suspension should rest on a bilateral or multilateral agreement containing effective inspection and verification safeguards.

McCone joined AEC officials in demonstrating the SNAP-3 radioisotope power technology to President Eisenhower at the White House.

McCone explained AEC concerns that proposed improvements in detecting underground nuclear tests remained theoretical and required experimental validation.

McCone raised concerns about verifying underground nuclear explosions and supported further experiments to improve detection methods before relying on a comprehensive test ban.

McCone testified before a Senate Foreign Relations subcommittee about the Geneva nuclear test negotiations and the technical problems of verification.

McCone joined senior officials in reviewing the expiring nuclear test moratorium and negotiating guidance before President Eisenhower made a new policy decision.

McCone transmitted guidance to the AEC after the administration decided how to handle the expiring moratorium and future Geneva negotiations.

McCone stated that there was no technical evidence of secret Soviet testing during the moratorium, while warning that small underground tests could escape detection.

McCone discussed the status of the test moratorium with President Eisenhower and reviewed technical questions with the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy.

McCone forwarded the AEC General Advisory Committee's assessment of Soviet nuclear weapons development possibilities during the testing moratorium.

McCone completed his service as Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission at the end of the Eisenhower administration.

President Kennedy announced that he intended to appoint McCone to succeed Allen Dulles as Director of Central Intelligence.

McCone began serving as a consultant so he could familiarize himself with CIA and the wider Intelligence Community before formally taking office.

Chief Justice Earl Warren administered McCone's oath as Director of Central Intelligence in the White House Cabinet Room.

McCone was sworn in as Director of Central Intelligence and became the fourth Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.

McCone established a working group led by Inspector General Lyman Kirkpatrick to examine CIA organization and the case for a separate scientific directorate.

McCone announced that CIA would establish a new directorate focused on research and development to strengthen technical intelligence capabilities.

President Kennedy directed McCone to concentrate on coordinating the entire foreign intelligence community while delegating more detailed CIA administration.

McCone appeared before the Senate Armed Services Committee during consideration of his nomination as Director of Central Intelligence.

The United States Senate confirmed McCone as Director of Central Intelligence after debate over his appointment and the CIA oversight relationship.

CIA issued the headquarters notice establishing the Deputy Directorate for Research, placing important technical collection programs within the new organization.

McCone appointed Herbert Scoville to lead the new Deputy Directorate for Research and concentrate CIA's emerging scientific and technical work.

McCone and Richard Helms visited Saigon and reviewed counterinsurgency, intelligence reporting, and CIA programs as the American commitment in South Vietnam expanded.

After the Geneva agreement on neutral Laos, McCone managed CIA responsibilities for supporting Hmong forces while seeking to keep the covert role limited.

McCone repeatedly warned that the Soviet buildup in Cuba might conceal plans to deploy offensive ballistic missiles.

McCone left Washington for a honeymoon in France, leaving Deputy Director Marshall Carter to serve as Acting Director during a critical period of the Cuban buildup.

McCone sent Gordon Gray a memorandum reviewing the history and development of the Buon Enao counterinsurgency project in South Vietnam.

From France, McCone warned that extensive Soviet defensive preparations in Cuba could be intended to conceal the later installation of medium-range ballistic missiles.

McCone returned from France after sending warnings that Soviet defensive preparations in Cuba could be masking an offensive missile deployment.

McCone questioned restrictions on U-2 coverage of Cuba and pressed for broader reconnaissance as evidence of the Soviet military buildup accumulated.

After learning that U-2 photography confirmed Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, McCone returned to Washington and remained there through the crisis.

McCone recommended warning Moscow and Havana, demanding prompt dismantlement, and reserving a large military strike if the offensive missile deployment remained in place.

McCone briefed senior officials on expanding photographic evidence and the estimated readiness of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba.

At Kennedy's request, McCone briefed former President Eisenhower on the Soviet buildup and showed him U-2 photographs of developing medium-range missile sites.

McCone reviewed new intelligence as reconnaissance identified additional missile activity and bomber-related installations in Cuba.

McCone joined Kennedy and senior advisers in reviewing blockade, air-strike, invasion, diplomatic, and warning options during the first days of the missile crisis.

McCone assessed the growing operational capability of the Soviet missile deployment while the administration refined its response.

McCone again briefed Eisenhower, this time explaining the administration's decision to combine a naval quarantine with demands for removal of the Soviet missiles.

McCone supplied intelligence judgments and photographic evidence supporting Kennedy's public disclosure of the Soviet missile deployment and the decision to impose a quarantine.

McCone reported intelligence indicating that Soviet personnel controlled the offensive missile installations in Cuba.

McCone briefed congressional leaders on the missile evidence, Soviet activity in Cuba, and the intelligence basis for the administration's quarantine policy.

McCone reviewed intelligence on Soviet shipping movements and continuing activity at Cuban missile sites as the quarantine took effect.

McCone reviewed estimates showing that work continued at several missile installations while diplomatic exchanges intensified.

McCone emphasized continued reconnaissance and verification after Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.

McCone reviewed reconnaissance showing dismantled missile equipment moving toward Cuban ports for shipment back to the Soviet Union.

McCone sent McGeorge Bundy a memorandum outlining courses of action to follow as the administration moved from immediate crisis management toward verification and settlement.

McCone reviewed an Inspector General examination of how raw intelligence on the Soviet buildup had been handled before the missiles were photographed.

McCone received a CIA review describing the reconnaissance gap over central Cuba and the caution that had limited U-2 coverage before 14 October.

McCone urged McGeorge Bundy not to give Cuba an unconditional non-invasion pledge without satisfactory arrangements for inspection, verification, and protection against subversion.

McCone briefed the Executive Committee on Soviet deployment, missile withdrawal, and intelligence concerning the continuing military situation in Cuba.

McCone warned Kennedy that Soviet communications, Cuban support for regional subversion, and Moscow's public claims required caution in any final settlement with Castro.

McCone treated the coordinated post-crisis review of intelligence performance and Cuban reconnaissance as the final Intelligence Community report for presidential advisers.

President Kennedy sent McCone a letter commending the Intelligence Community for its contribution during the Cuban Missile Crisis.

McCone rejected a pessimistic draft national estimate on South Vietnam and directed further consultation, producing a final estimate with a more optimistic assessment.

McCone warned that a proposed test ban could constrain American weapons development without adequate assurance that prohibited Soviet activity would be detected.

McCone recommended that the United States disassociate itself from unauthorized Cuban exile raids and take steps to prevent their continuation.

CIA initiated the Purcell Panel to advise McCone on the future course of the National Reconnaissance Program and advanced technical collection.

CIA established a Research and Development Review Board to coordinate scientific and technical programs across Agency components during McCone's reorganization.

Herbert Scoville left the research directorate, prompting McCone to reorganize CIA's science and technology structure and seek new leadership.

McCone created the Directorate of Science and Technology and selected Albert Wheelon to lead the expanded organization for technical intelligence and research.

McCone resisted proposals that would weaken CIA control of its Saigon station while officials debated Ambassador Lodge's authority and possible leadership changes.

McCone wrote Henry Cabot Lodge, opposing Edward Lansdale as Saigon station chief while agreeing to find a replacement for John Richardson if required.

McCone participated in administration discussions about exploratory contacts with Fidel Castro but regarded the diplomatic initiative skeptically while covert pressure continued.

McCone directed creation of the Foreign Missile and Space Analysis Center to strengthen independent CIA assessment of foreign missile and space capabilities.

McCone joined Kennedy, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, and Bundy in reviewing the rapidly developing coup situation and American responsibilities in South Vietnam.

McCone told Averell Harriman that CIA had not coordinated or endorsed the August policy cable on South Vietnam as Harriman had been led to believe.

McCone returned from Vietnam more discouraged about the war and increasingly doubtful that South Vietnamese leadership could carry its share of the burden.

At President Johnson's early Vietnam policy conference, McCone gave a less optimistic assessment than other officials and questioned favorable forecasts from Saigon.

McCone discussed Cuba with President Johnson, who requested firm recommendations and more aggressive options while rejecting any repetition of the Bay of Pigs failure.

McCone told Johnson that portraying the DCI chiefly as a covert operator impaired his broader intelligence role; Johnson agreed that the public image should change.

McCone completed discussions in Saigon and found weak governmental leadership, uncertain military progress, and serious shortcomings in reporting on the counterinsurgency.

McCone ordered experienced CIA officers to Saigon temporarily to develop additional covert reporting on the new government's effectiveness and public acceptance.

McCone told President Johnson that there were more reasons for pessimism than optimism in South Vietnam and that the new military government had not demonstrated effective leadership.

McCone approved an unusual advisory role for Soviet defector Anatoliy Golitsyn within CIA counterintelligence as officers investigated possible hostile penetration of the Agency.

McCone accepted the counterintelligence view that Yuri Nosenko should not testify before the Warren Commission while the CIA continued disputing the credibility of his claims about Lee Harvey Oswald.

McCone proposed a covert method for independently checking reports on the progress of the South Vietnamese war and counterinsurgency effort.

McCone discussed Vietnam with the Joint Chiefs while questioning whether existing intelligence reporting gave policymakers a reliable picture of conditions in the field.

Following McCone's order, Soviet KGB defector Yuri Nosenko was brought to the United States for intensive questioning about his intelligence claims and Lee Harvey Oswald.

McCone joined a Special Group meeting reviewing clandestine and covert activities against Cuba while the Johnson administration reconsidered its pressure campaign.

McCone concluded that intelligence agencies had failed to anticipate the January coup by Nguyen Khanh and questioned whether warning indicators had been properly analyzed.

McCone was persuaded that Nosenko should not appear before the Warren Commission while CIA counterintelligence officers continued challenging the defector's credibility.

McCone testified before the Warren Commission about CIA information relevant to Lee Harvey Oswald and possible foreign involvement in President Kennedy's assassination.

McCone challenged publication of The Invisible Government after CIA concluded that the book contained numerous security disclosures as well as many significant inaccuracies.

McCone told the National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee that he wanted CIA to retain its existing contracting responsibility for the CORONA satellite program.

McCone briefed reconnaissance officials on plans to strengthen CIA's West Coast component and consolidate Agency contracting and support functions for CORONA.

After China conducted its first atomic test, McCone emphasized the importance of technical collection and strategic estimates for tracking the emerging Chinese nuclear capability.

CIA introduced the President's Daily Brief for Lyndon Johnson, replacing earlier formats with a concise intelligence product tailored to his reading habits.

McCone commended CIA officers who prepared intelligence briefings for his appearances before the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.

McCone warned President Johnson against relying on an expanded ground war and argued that military pressure on North Vietnam required a broader strategic approach.

McCone participated in a senior review of an Intelligence Community assessment on Vietnam while continuing to challenge assumptions behind the administration's escalation plans.

McCone met President Johnson for the final time as DCI, urged stronger personal intelligence briefings for his successor, and retired as William Raborn took office.