Cuban Missile Crisis
Dillon joined the crisis deliberations and supported careful evaluation of the economic and political consequences of military action.
Explore 347 historical events and records for United States of America in 1962.
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Dillon joined the crisis deliberations and supported careful evaluation of the economic and political consequences of military action.
Kennedy convened his principal advisers at 11:45 a.m. to examine the missile evidence and possible responses.
Kennedy ordered continued secrecy while advisers studied the risks of surprise attack, quarantine, and invasion.
Kennedy ordered that the discovery of Soviet missiles remain secret while his advisers evaluated military and diplomatic options.
Robert Kennedy joined the first crisis discussions and questioned the political and moral consequences of a surprise attack on Cuba.
Robert Kennedy participated in the secret advisory meetings that later became known as ExComm.
Lundahl briefed Kennedy directly on the U-2 photographs and explained how analysts identified the Soviet missile equipment.
McNamara discussed military options including surveillance, quarantine, air strikes, and invasion.
Rusk joined discussions of diplomatic, political, and military responses to the Soviet deployment.
Taylor and the Joint Chiefs developed plans for attacks against missile sites and other military targets.
After learning that U-2 photography confirmed Soviet offensive missiles in Cuba, McCone returned to Washington and remained there through the crisis.
McCone recommended warning Moscow and Havana, demanding prompt dismantlement, and reserving a large military strike if the offensive missile deployment remained in place.
Bundy coordinated meetings and intelligence distribution as advisers compared military and political responses to the missile deployment.
Gilpatric helped assess air-strike and quarantine options while the Defense Department prepared forces for possible action.
Kennedy continued reviewing air-strike, invasion, quarantine, and diplomatic alternatives with his advisers.
McCone briefed senior officials on expanding photographic evidence and the estimated readiness of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba.
McNamara asked military planners to refine blockade, air-strike, and invasion options while the President considered how to respond.
Rusk examined diplomatic consequences of air strikes, invasion, and quarantine while the missile discovery remained secret.
Stevenson urged consideration of a diplomatic settlement alongside military pressure.
At Kennedy's request, McCone briefed former President Eisenhower on the Soviet buildup and showed him U-2 photographs of developing medium-range missile sites.
Kennedy told Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko that the United States would not tolerate offensive missiles in Cuba; Gromyko denied that offensive Soviet weapons were being deployed.
Kennedy met Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko while withholding knowledge of the photographed missile sites.
Kennedy restated his public warning to Gromyko without revealing that the missile sites had been photographed.
Lundahl's analysts continued comparing new imagery to Soviet missile systems and locating additional offensive installations.
McCone reviewed new intelligence as reconnaissance identified additional missile activity and bomber-related installations in Cuba.
McNamara worked on a quarantine plan designed to halt additional offensive weapons without immediately attacking existing missile sites.
Rusk participated in preparations for the Gromyko meeting and supported maintaining secrecy about the photographic evidence.
Stevenson proposed exploring a negotiated settlement that could remove the Soviet missiles while avoiding a direct military confrontation.
Taylor presented military assessments emphasizing that an air strike might have to be followed by a larger invasion of Cuba.
Thompson used his experience with Khrushchev to advise that Soviet intentions and domestic pressures should be interpreted cautiously.
McCone joined Kennedy and senior advisers in reviewing blockade, air-strike, invasion, diplomatic, and warning options during the first days of the missile crisis.
Kennedy maintained scheduled campaign appearances while secret crisis deliberations continued in Washington.
Kennedy left Washington for campaign appearances while advisers continued secret deliberations about Cuba.
Robert Kennedy argued that an unannounced air strike could resemble the attack on Pearl Harbor.
Bundy helped organize the decision process that produced Kennedy's choice of a naval quarantine.
Kennedy returned to Washington and presided over a National Security Council meeting on the response.
The White House announced that Kennedy had a cold as he cancelled remaining campaign appearances.
Kennedy selected a naval quarantine as the initial response while retaining stronger military options.
Robert Kennedy supported the quarantine option as a measured response that preserved room for further diplomatic pressure.
McNamara organized the naval interception plan and continued preparations for air strikes and invasion.
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