Cuban Missile Crisis
McNamara closely supervised naval operations as the quarantine line became active in the Atlantic approaches to Cuba.
Explore 347 historical events and records for United States of America in 1962.
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McNamara closely supervised naval operations as the quarantine line became active in the Atlantic approaches to Cuba.
Rusk assessed Soviet responses to the quarantine and encouraged continued diplomatic contact while military forces remained ready.
Thompson argued that Khrushchev should be given a path to retreat without appearing to accept an American ultimatum.
Kennedy replied to U Thant and affirmed his desire for a peaceful and verifiable settlement.
Kennedy wrote Khrushchev that Soviet assurances had been contradicted by clear evidence of offensive missile bases in Cuba.
Stevenson confronted Valerian Zorin at the Security Council and presented reconnaissance photographs demonstrating Soviet missile installations.
Kennedy delayed military action to allow additional time for diplomacy after receiving Khrushchev's proposal.
Khrushchev sends a letter to Kennedy suggesting that the sites would be dismantled if the United States gave its reassurance that it would not invade Cuba.
Robert Kennedy supported giving diplomacy more time after Khrushchev sent a message offering missile removal for a non-invasion pledge.
McCone reviewed estimates showing that work continued at several missile installations while diplomatic exchanges intensified.
Rusk reviewed Khrushchev's first settlement proposal and supported exploring the possibility of a non-invasion assurance.
Scali reported a Soviet back-channel proposal linking missile removal to a United States pledge not to invade Cuba.
Stevenson worked with U Thant on proposals intended to reduce the risk of a naval or military clash.
Thompson interpreted Khrushchev's first letter as a serious opening for a negotiated settlement.
A Soviet surface-to-air missile shot down Anderson's unarmed U-2 over Cuba, killing him.
Ball took part in discussions over the competing Soviet proposals and the risks of linking Cuba publicly to Jupiter missiles in Turkey.
Bundy participated in the intense ExComm deliberations over the U-2 loss and Khrushchev's changing settlement terms.
Dillon joined the ExComm debate on how to answer Khrushchev while avoiding immediate escalation on the crisis's most dangerous day.
Kennedy answered Khrushchev's first proposal and offered a non-invasion assurance after verified missile removal.
Kennedy authorized Robert Kennedy to tell Dobrynin privately that American Jupiter missiles in Turkey would later be removed.
Kennedy chose to answer Khrushchev's earlier, more conciliatory proposal while leaving the public demand concerning Turkey unanswered.
Kennedy postponed retaliation for the U-2 loss while advisers pursued a diplomatic solution.
Robert Kennedy told Dobrynin that the President could not publicly trade the Turkish Jupiter missiles for Soviet missiles in Cuba.
Robert Kennedy warned Dobrynin that events could soon escape political control if the Soviet missiles were not withdrawn.
Robert Kennedy met secretly with Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin at the Justice Department.
Maultsby's U-2 accidentally entered Soviet airspace during a mission over the Arctic and escaped interception.
McNamara argued against automatic retaliation after the loss of Rudolf Anderson's U-2, helping preserve time for negotiation.
Rusk participated in the decision to respond to Khrushchev's earlier letter rather than accept the public Turkey-for-Cuba trade.
Sorensen helped draft the response accepting the essential terms of Khrushchev's first proposal while avoiding a public missile trade.
Taylor advised on military responses after Anderson's U-2 was destroyed by a surface-to-air missile over Cuba.
Thompson urged Kennedy to answer Khrushchev's first message and avoid becoming trapped by the later public demand concerning Turkey.
Bundy helped coordinate immediate follow-up after the Soviet decision to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
Kennedy directed officials to continue verification and quarantine measures until Soviet offensive weapons were actually removed.
Kennedy welcomed Khrushchev's decision as an important contribution to peace.
Robert Kennedy participated in discussions on implementing the agreement while maintaining secrecy around the private Turkish missile understanding.
McCone emphasized continued reconnaissance and verification after Khrushchev agreed to dismantle and remove the offensive missiles.
McNamara directed the military to maintain pressure and surveillance while Soviet forces began preparing the missiles for removal.
Rusk directed diplomatic work on verification and implementation after Moscow announced that the missiles would be removed.
Sorensen assisted with Kennedy's public response welcoming the Soviet decision to remove the missiles from Cuba.
Taylor kept United States forces at high readiness while officials awaited evidence that Soviet dismantling had begun.
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